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In this paper, we review and attempt to explain the changes in business cycle synchronization among
16 industrial countries and the over the past century and a quarter, demarcated into four exchange
rate regimes. We find that there is a secular trend towards increased synchronization for much of the
twentieth century and that it occurs across diverse exchange rate regimes. This finding is in marked
contrast to much of the recent literature, which has focused primarily on the evidence for the past 20
or 30 years and which has produced mixed results. We then examine the role of global shocks and
shock transmission in the trend toward synchronization. Our key finding here is that global (common)
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The synchronized rapid and dramatic decline in output across the globe in the second half of 
2008 put an abrupt end to the spreading musings of decoupling in national business cycles that 
emerged in early 2007 when the U.S. economy started slowing. In fact, the current global slump 
has been a striking reminder of how synchronized national business cycle downturns can be. 
This experience is in marked contrast with the experience of the two decades leading up to 2007, 
during which it was difficult to find strong evidence of increased or increasing business cycle 
linkages among industrial countries. Depending on the sample period, output correlations have 
even decreased in recent decades, largely on account of a remarkable cycle de-synchronization 




In this paper, we look at international business cycle synchronization from a historical 
perspective. The merit of such an approach is that short sample periods may mask important 
trends in synchronization patterns. In the short term, much of the business cycle dynamics 
depends on the shock dynamics, which tends to overshadow the effects of integration. Against 
this, we review and attempt to explain changes in international business cycle synchronization 
over 120 years using a framework in the tradition of the impulse-propagation approach to 
business cycles. Specifically, we seek to determine whether synchronization has increased and, if 
so, whether the changes in synchronization reflect changes in the nature of the impulses (the 
“shocks”) driving the economies, particularly the role of global shocks, changes in the 
                                                 
1See also Doyle and Faust (2003) and Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2008).  - 4 - 
transmission channels, or both. On the basis of this analysis, we then examine the relationship 
between business cycle synchronization and globalization and the role of financial factors in the 
dynamics of global output shocks. 
 
From a historical perspective, the evidence in favor of increased business cycle synchronization 
is clear-cut. We find a secular trend towards increased synchronization that occurs across 
exchange rate regimes. This evidence is rather puzzling, however, considering the usual 
explanation for increased synchronization.  While there appears to be an almost linear increase in 
business cycle synchronization over time, the level of globalization, that is, the degree of cross-
border integration in markets for goods, capital, and labor, has followed a U-shaped pattern 
during the same period (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003, and Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin, 1999). 
Starting from a relatively high degree of globalization during the period of the classical gold 
standard, international integration decreased sharply during the interwar period before it began to 
rise again, first slowly during the Bretton Woods period and then more rapidly in the current 
floating rate period. Recent studies have documented that the degree of globalization prevailing 
in the 1880s was only reached again 100 years later (ibid.).  
 
These results are not necessarily surprising from a theoretical perspective since the correlation 
between business cycle synchronization and integration is not necessarily positive. For example, 
Krugman (1993) noted that stronger trade integration may lead to greater regional specialization, 
which can lead to less output synchronization with industry-specific shocks. Relatedly, 
Heathcote and Perri (2004) showed how increased financial integration may be an endogenous - 5 - 
reaction to the regionalization of real sector linkages, as the latter allow for gains from the global 
diversification of asset portfolios.  
 
For this investigation, we use annual data for 16 countries that cover four distinct eras with 
different international monetary regimes.
 2 The four eras covered are 1880-1913 when much of 
the world adhered to the classical Gold Standard, the interwar period (1920-1938), the Bretton 
Woods regime of fixed but adjustable exchange rates (1948-1972), and the modern period of 
managed floating among the major currency areas (1973 to 2008). Across the four eras that we 
examine, the variation in cross-border integration in the markets for goods, capital and financial 
assets has been considerably larger than over the last 20 years while the influence of particular 
shock realizations appears arguably to have been somewhat less important. The annual data for 
16 industrial countries that we use in this paper come from Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, and 1998c) 
and other sources. They were used by Bergman, Bordo, and Jonung (1998) and Bordo and 
Jonung (2001).
3 Analyzing business cycle features with annual data implies that higher 
frequency features are not captured adequately. Nevertheless, we believe that using a much 
longer data sample provides a much-needed broader and complementary perspective on business 
cycle synchronization despite these problems. Our approach follows Bergman, Bordo and 
                                                 
2These references also provide more details on the data. The countries included in our data set are Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. In some of the tables, we list the countries by their geographical proximity 
rather than in alphabetical order.  
3The IMF’s International Financial Statistics was used to update the dataset to 2008. - 6 - 
Jonung (1998) and Backus and Kehoe (1992), who have shown the merit of looking at business 
cycle phenomena from a long-term perspective.
4 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses conceptual issues regarding international 
business cycle synchronization and provides the basic stylized facts. The subsequent section 
looks at the role that changes in this structure of shocks may have played in the observed 
changes in the synchronization of cycles. Section IV considers the role of global shocks and 
financial factors in cycle synchronization. Section V analyzes the relationship between business 
cycle synchronization and the path of globalization. Section VI concludes.  
 
II.   CROSS-COUNTRY BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONIZATION OVER TIME 
 
The notion of business cycles becoming increasingly synchronized across countries captures the 
observation that the timing and magnitudes of major changes in economic activity appear 
increasingly similar. For example, in the current slump, output collapsed in all major economies 
at about the same time. Despite frequent use, however, definitions of synchronization vary 
widely in the literature, As noted by Harding and Pagan (2004), most definitions are not 
capturing business cycle synchronization in the tradition of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) because they are based on other business cycle concepts. In their paper, they 
develop a statistical apparatus that allows for measurement and testing of cycle synchronization 
in the NBER tradition. Specifically, they consider national business cycles to be synchronized if 
                                                 
4Unlike these papers, we focus on international synchronization and devote less attention to the comparison of 
national business cycle properties such as output volatility or output-consumption comovements. - 7 - 
turning points in the corresponding reference cycles occur roughly at the same points in time. On 
this basis, they have derived a statistical measure, the concordance correlation, that allows one to 
test whether national cycles are significantly synchronized or not. This approach to measuring 
synchronization boils down to national business cycles being in the same phase—expansions and 
recessions—at about the same time.  
 
In this paper, we will not follow Harding and Pagan. Analyzing cycles using turning points 
would add an unwarranted layer of complexity to the analysis. Ultimately, as Harding and Pagan 
(op. cit.) have shown, their measure of cycle synchronization depends on the moments of output 
growth. For an analytical understanding of the changes in the synchronization, it is, therefore, 
sufficient to focus on the changes in these moments.
5 Hence, to establish the stylized facts, we 
can use correlations among output growth rates as a measure of the strength of cross-country 
linkages in macroeconomic fluctuations. This is also the most widely used measure in the recent 
academic literature on the international business cycle.  
 
We will, however, follow Harding and Pagan (2003, 2004), Stock and Watson (1999), and others 
by using real gross domestic product—or output in short—as the measure of aggregate economic 
activity or the business cycle rather than synthetic reference cycle series based on a number of 
series (the NBER approach).  
 
                                                 
5In Bordo and Helbling (2004), measurement issues are discussed in greater depth, and patterns of cycle 
synchronization are established using three different measures.  - 8 - 
Figure 1 shows the correlation coefficients for log output growth by percentile for the four eras. 
The distribution of the correlation coefficients differs substantially from era to era. In particular, 
there has been a tendency toward higher, positive output correlations, not just a one-time level 
increase in synchronization. During the Gold Standard, about one half of all country pairs were 
characterized by negative output correlations and the average output correlation coefficient is 
about 0 (Table 1). A first important step toward synchronization occurred during the interwar 
period, when the share of negative correlations fell below 30 percent while the average 
correlation increased to about 0.15. A subsequent reversal during the Bretton Woods era was 
small, and correlations remained, on average, above those found for the Gold Standard era. A 
second important increase then occurred during 1973-2008, when less than 10 percent of all 
correlations were negative and the average correlation was 0.33.  
 
Many of these changes in correlations across eras are statistically different from zero, on the 
basis of both nonparametric and parametric tests.
6 The issue of statistical significance is relevant 
since the confidence intervals for the bilateral correlation coefficients are relatively wide given 
the relatively few observations per era.
7  
 
The non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is a test of the null hypothesis that the location of 
the bilateral correlation coefficients (the elements of the population) is identical across eras. As 
                                                 
6See Bordo and Helbling (2003) for more details. 
7The sampling standard deviation of estimated correlation coefficients depends on the size of the estimated 
coefficient and the number of observations. Given the former, small samples tend to amplify the sampling 
uncertainty greatly. For example, for a correlation coefficient of 0.15—the average for the interwar period—the 
standard deviation for a sample of 20 observations is 0.23. With 50 and 100 sample observations, the standard 
deviations decline to 0.14 and 0.10, respectively. - 9 - 
shown in Table 2, the test results suggest that the upward shifts in the distribution of the 
correlation coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level for the interwar period (compared to 
the Gold Standard era) and for the modern floating era (compared to both the interwar and the 
Bretton Woods eras). However, the downward shift in the distribution of correlations from the 
interwar to the Bretton Woods eras is not significant.  
 
Parametric tests of the null hypothesis that two correlation matrices are equal, based on the 
approach proposed by Jennrich (1970), suggest rejection of the hypothesis that output 
correlations in the modern floating era have been equal to those recorded in earlier eras (Table 
2). The marked increases in the correlations in the floating era are thus statistically significant. 
Among the other eras, however, the null hypothesis of equality between of correlation matrices is 
accepted. Overall, these tests support our view that, from a historical perspective, there is strong 
evidence of an increase in business cycle synchronization.  
 
So far, we have looked at business cycle synchronization through a global lens, noting the 
increased synchronization without consideration for other factors. However, one would expect 
that synchronization patterns differ considerably across groups of countries, depending on factors 
such as “gravity” or country size. The evidence clearly illustrates that the extent to which gravity 
has shaped the synchronization trends depends on the region (see the results in Table 1). For core 
European countries (the old “EEC”) and Continental European countries, the increase in business 
cycle synchronization was clearly much sharper than the general increase. At the other end of 
gravitas, business cycle synchronization between Japan and the other countries in the panel has - 10 - 
increased by less. In particular, there is no evidence for an increase between the Bretton Woods 
era and the modern floating rate period.  
 
The fact that the increase for all Continental European countries was smaller than that for the 
Core European countries suggests that the forces of gravity are affected by common policies, 
preferential trading agreements, and specific currency arrangements. The increase in correlations 
among the Anglo-Saxon countries is also remarkable even though it seems more difficult to 
attribute this to forces of gravity.
8 While we do not believe that common institutions and heritage 
among the Anglo-Saxon countries account directly for the increased synchronization, as Otto et 
al. (2001) have argued, they likely have fostered similar patterns in the transmission of shocks 
through what appear to be similar, market-based financial systems.  
 
While the regional perspective reinforces the notion of a trend increase, it should be noted that 
stark regional differences have only really emerged during the modern floating rate period. 
Forces of gravity were not a factor behind business cycle synchronization during the classical 
Gold Standard, as differences in correlations among regions were minor, with the high 
correlation between Canada and the United States and, to a much lesser extent, among the 
Scandinavian countries, being the main exceptions. During the Bretton Woods period, increased 
regional synchronization began to emerge in the core European countries. Interestingly, the 
increased synchronization during the interwar period was primarily on account of an increased 
                                                 
8The emergence of strong business cycle linkages among core European countries and among the Anglo-Saxon 
countries was noted, among others, by Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) and Stock and Watson (2005). - 11 - 
synchronization between the cycles in the United States and other countries, which in turn seems 
to reflect the equity boom bust cycle and its effects from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s. 
 
The experience with synchronized recessions over the past few decades seems to suggest that 
downturns tend to be more common than expansions. The historical record shows that greater 
output synchronization during downturns is a phenomenon that has emerged with the tendency 
toward greater business cycle synchronization more generally. In the gold standard era, the 
average correlation coefficient for output growth between two countries when at least one of 
them was in recession was only marginally higher than that based on observations for the entire 
era (lower panel of Table 1).
9 Over time, however, output correlations during recessions have 
risen even faster than they have when measured for entire eras. Increased business cycle 
synchronization over time, therefore, does not seem driven by the frequency of recessions. In 
fact, the average number of countries in recession per year has varied across the four eras 
without trend. Starting from 4 during the gold standard era, the number increased to 4.8 during 
the interwar period, then fell to less than 1 in the Bretton Woods periods, and finally rose to 
about 1.7 in the modern floating rate era.  
 
We also examined whether there were large changes in the magnitudes of correlation coefficients 
over the modern floating era, given some recent studies suggesting that there had been a decrease 
in output synchronization over the past two decades after 1985 than an increase (e.g., Heathcote 
and Perri, 2004). Specifically, we compared output correlations over 1986-2006 with those for 
                                                 
9Following the NBER approach, recession periods were identified as those years in which log output growth was 
negative. - 12 - 
the entire modern floating era which spans the period 1973-2008. The last column in Table 1 
shows that the differences in correlations coefficients are very small. Given the number of 
observations, these differences are not statistically significant. We conclude from this exercise 
that the secular trend toward increased business synchronization seems to be a robust result. 
 
So far, all the cycle correlations we have studied were based on log first differences of output. 
Does the detrending method matter for our findings? Naturally, high frequency noise is not a 
great concern, given our panels of annual data, but it is possible that the increases in cycle 
correlations from the 19
th to the end of the 20
th century really reflect changes in trend 
comovements. In Bordo and Helbling (2004), we also examined correlation patterns in bandpass-
filtered log output data. The results show that the detrending method makes little difference and 
that the same principal changes in the patterns of cycle synchronization are found with bandpass-
filtered output data.  
 
III.   EXPLAINING SYNCHRONIZATION: THE ROLE OF SHOCKS AND TRANSMISSION 
 
Using a standard measure of business cycle synchronization, we found evidence of increased 
cross-country business cycle synchronization over time among industrial countries. From an 
impulse-propagation perspective, the increased synchronization could reflect changes in the 
nature of the impulses (the “shocks”) driving the economies, especially changes in their cross-
country correlations, changes in the transmission channels and mechanisms, resulting inter alia 
from increased integration, or, most likely, both.  
 - 13 - 
Disentangling the relative contributions of the changes in the correlation of shocks and changes 
in the transmission channels to the changes in output correlations is difficult, however, as this 
would require a comprehensive structural model of the economy that can be estimated 
empirically. Such a model, which would need to allow for factors such as changes in trade and 
financial integration and a multitude of shocks, seems beyond our reach, given the current state 
of the art in multi-country modeling. Financial integration, for example, is not yet satisfactorily 
accounted for in any of the leading multi-country models.  
 
Against this background, we will proceed with a more modest research agenda. In this section, 
we will focus on deriving measures of the impulses driving each economy and study the changes 
in their variance-covariance structure. On this basis, we will then attempt to assess the extent to 
which changes in this structure of shocks may help to explain the observed changes in the 
synchronization of cycles.  
 
A.   Analytical Framework 
 
To structure our discussion, we follow Canova and Dellas (1993) and use the following 
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10Canova and Dellas (1993) show how a very stylized two-country real business cycle model implies such a bi-
variate vector autoregressive representation. Doyle and Faust (2002) use a simple error-components structure to 
illustrate similar issues.  - 14 - 
 
where yit denotes the log output growth rate in country i. Following Stock and Watson (2005), 














   (3.2) 
 
In this factor model of the VAR errors, ζ is a global shock and ηi is a country-specific 
idiosyncratic shock. G is a vector of factor loadings. The matrix moving average representation 
of the factor VAR (FAVAR) model follows as: 
 
 () (), tt t YC L G C L     (3.1) 
 
The unconditional variance-covariance matrix of the vector yt is given by: 
 
  [ ] (1) (1) (1) (1) tt EYY C G GC C C        (3.2) 
 
provided that independence between the global factor ζt and the idiosyncratic errors ηit holds.  
 
 
What can explain increased output synchronization—as measured by the correlation between 
outputs of countries 1 and 2—in this model? General statements are difficult to make since 
determination of signs and magnitudes of the partial derivatives of (3.2) depend on multiplicative 
terms of the underlying parameters. However, partial derivatives around parameter values that 
                                                 
11In contrast, in the standard dynamic factor model, the coefficient matrix A is usually assumed to be zero and the 
dynamics arise from the factors, which are modelled as autoregressive processes. - 15 - 
are empirically relevant, notably positive first-order autocorrelation coefficients, a11 and a22, and 
positive spillover coefficients, a11 and a22, suggest three reasons for increased output 
synchronization:
12 
  Increases in the variance of the global shock relative to the country specific idiosyncratic 
shocks.  
  Increases in the size of the “transmission” coefficients a12 and a21, which determine the 
spillover effects that shocks in country 1 have on country 2 and vice versa as well as 
those arising from the effects of global shocks elsewhere.
13  
  Increases in the size of the “autoregressive” coefficients a11 and a22, as greater persistence 
in a country’s output fluctuation increases the scope for spillovers. Compared to the 
previous two factors, the effect of changes in the autoregressive coefficients on output 
correlations tends to be small.  
 
Extending the model to our 16-country panel leads to the following equation for a country i: 
 
16
,, 1 , 1 ,
1,
it i it i j jt it
jj i
yy y    

     (3.3) 
and  
 
  tt t G    (3.4) 
                                                 
12The reader should also recall that the idiosyncratic shocks are not correlated by assumption in thes two country 
framework. Otherwise, the global shock could not be identified. With a larger cross-country dimension, however, 
limited correlation among idiosyncratic shocks becomes possible, as discussed below.  
13In the simple model of Canova and Dellas (op. cit.), these coefficients follow from the production structure, as 
foreign intermediate goods are needed to produce the final consumption goods.  - 16 - 
where the vector Nt includes all errors νit and the vector Ht all idiosyncratic shocks ηit (i=1,…, 
16). Estimating this general FAVAR model in our sample is difficult. Given few observations for 
each era, very few degrees of freedom would be left if the model were estimated even with one 
lag. For the interwar era, the number of common observations for all 16 countries is even less 
than the number of parameters, so that comparability of the model across eras could not be 
ensured. In the circumstances, we imposed a priori restrictions and estimated two more restricted 
versions of the general factor VAR model for each era.  
 
  The center country model. In this version, the equation for each country’s real GDP 
growth includes lagged own GDP growth and lagged GDP growth in the center country 
(the United Kingdom in the Gold Standard era and the United States in the other eras). In 
other words, the coefficients δij are assumed to be zero for all j except for the center 
country. The rationale behind this model is that idiosyncratic shocks in the center country 
can be transmitted through the traditional channels while idiosyncratic shocks elsewhere 
have only limited effects on other countries.  
 
  The trade linkages model. In this version, the equation for each country’s real GDP 
growth includes lagged GDP growth and lagged GDP growth in important trading partner 
countries (the ones reported in Mitchell, 1998a, 1998b, and 1998c).
14 The rationale 
behind this model is, of course, straightforward.  
 
                                                 
14Mitchell (op. cit.) reports bilateral trade with 5 to 7 important trading partners for the Gold Standard and the 
Interwar eras. We used those with entities in our data set only.  - 17 - 
We estimated the models with a two-step, semi-parametric procedure, similar to the one used by 
Bernanke et al. (2005), for estimating our two factor vector-autoregressive model. In the first 
step, we used SURE estimators to obtain the coefficients βi and δij and the residual series νit. In a 
second step, we used the nonparametric static approximate factor model of Ng and Bai (2002) to 
obtain the global shock ζ and the idiosyncratic shocks ηi from the residual series νit. This model 
allows for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and limited contemporaneous cross-correlation in 
the idiosyncratic components. Following standard practice in the literature, we use the first 
common factor to measure the common shock driving cross-country business cycle 
fluctuations.
15 Both models turned out to be roughly similar in terms of information criteria for 
all eras, although the restrictions implied by the center model compared to the trade model were 
rejected by standard likelihood ratio tests.  
 
B.   Results 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the estimated coefficients in the two models.
16 Two features stand out. 
First, the average autoregressive parameter (i.e., the coefficient βi) across countries has clearly 
increased over time. For both models, the average autoregressive parameter was slightly negative 
during the Gold Standard era and positive during the other eras. The minimum, as indicated by 
the lower bound, given by the 5 percent percentile, increased over time while the maximum only 
                                                 
15Bai and Ng (2002) proposed to use information criteria to determine the appropriate number of factors. However, 
their Monte Carlo simulations show that for panel datasets where the cross-sectional and time dimensions are as low 
as in ours, the tests are not very reliable and tend to imply too high a number of factors.  
16The coefficient estimates for the trade model for the interwar period implied unstable dynamics, and we do not 
report results for this period for this model. - 18 - 
increased in the case of the trade model.
17 Second, the transmission coefficients have changed 
surprisingly little. For the center model, there is some evidence that the average transmission 
coefficient has increased slightly but the range given the 95 percent confidence interval appears 
to have changed only marginally. In contrast, for the trade model, the average hardly changed but 
the range, especially in the positive domain, increased.  
 
We now turn to the shocks. Table 3 shows the average standard deviations of the national output 
series (log growth rates) and compares them with the estimated variances of the global shock and 
the average idiosyncratic shock.
18  The standard deviations of both global and idiosyncratic 
shocks generally decline over time, as it was to be expected, given the decline in output growth 
volatility.
19  However, as noted earlier, what matters for the changes in output correlations is the 
relative change in the standard deviations of the two types of shocks. While idiosyncratic shocks 
were clearly more volatile than global shocks during the Gold Standard, their volatility has, on 
average, declined a bit more rapidly than that of the global shock, although after the interwar 
period, the differences in the relative decline became small.  
 
                                                 
17Following the stability analysis for the bilateral output correlations discussed in the previous section, we also 
examined parameter stability in the modern floating era. Specifically, we tested for the stability of the autoregressive 
coefficients, which tend to be sensitive to structural breaks in the data. Likelihood  ratio tests comparing 
specifications of both kinds of FAVAR models with and without a structural break in the autoregressive parameters 
after 1985 suggest acceptance of the null hypothesis that there is no structural break. For the center model, the 
likelihood ratio test statistics is 20.55, while for the trade model, it is 8.752 (the 5 percent marginal significance 
value for χ
2(16) is 26.3). 
18Naturally, only the product Gζt is identified in this factor model. We normalized the square of the factor loadings, 
i.e., G’G/16=1, to identify ζt. We believe this to be the natural normalization, as it allows for comparable variances 
between outputs and factors. The alternative would have been be to normalize the factor variance to 1 (Bai and Ng, 
2002) and to let the factor loadings adjust to replicate output variances  
19The general moderation in the amplitude of output fluctuations has been analyzed by Blanchard and Simon (2001). - 19 - 
To examine the combined effects of the changes in parameters and shock properties over time on 
business cycle synchronization, we performed two sets of calculations. First, we performed 
standard forecast error variance decompositions. Table 4 presents 1 to 4-year ahead forecast error 
variance decompositions of the output growth rates, averaged across countries, for the four eras, 
distinguishing between the shares of total output variance explained by the global shock, the 
idiosyncratic shocks, and transmission. Specifically, the variance decomposition for output 
growth in country i was derived as: 
 
16
22 2 2 2
,
11 1 ,1
[ ] () () () ()
hh h
th i th i i i j i i
ss j i j s
E yC s C s C s C s    
   
      
   (3.5) 
 
where  () ii Cs   and  () ij Cs   are elements of the matrix product C(s)G, with C and G defined earlier, 
and where  () i Csdenotes row i of the matrix C for i=1,...,16. . The first term in this equation 
reflects the immediate impact of global shocks on domestic output. In Table 4, it is reported 
under the column “Global factor-Own.” The second term captures the transmission of the effects 
of the global shock on other countries. The third term is the combined contribution of the 
idiosyncratic shocks, encompassing both direct effects and transmission. Given our approximate 
factor model formulation for the idiosyncratic errors, the direct effects are of two kinds, namely 
the purely country-specific part of the shocks and those arising from the cross-correlation among 
the idiosyncratic shocks. In the absence of a structural model, we distinguished the two effects 
by first calculating the effects of the conditional idiosyncratic shocks, that is, the effects of the 
shocks ηi given the idiosyncratic shocks ηj, (j=1,…16, j≠i), elsewhere, which we then subtracted 
from the total effects of idiosyncratic shocks to obtain the effects due to transmission and - 20 - 
idiosyncratic shock correlation.
20 Denoting the variance of the conditional shocks with 
2
i    , the 
column “Idiosyncratic factors-own” in Table 4 reflects the direct impact of the purely country-









   . This decomposition 
does not imply causality in the sense of the shocks ηj, (j=1,…,16, j≠i) being exogenous from the 
perspective of country i. On the contrary, the causality may well run from country i to the other 
countries. The conditional variance simply captures the part of the idiosyncratic shock variance 
that is uncorrelated to idiosyncratic shocks elsewhere. 
 
The variance decomposition suggests the following. In general, idiosyncratic shocks have 
become less important over time in shaping each country’s output dynamics while global shocks 
have become more important. At the same time, the transmission of shocks across borders has 
also increased. Within this broad picture, however, the relative importance of these two factors in 
explaining the changes in the forecast error variance depends on the model and the eras used in 
the comparison. The results for the center model suggest that the increases in the relative 
variance of the global shocks account for most of the increase in output variance explained by 
the global factor, which itself depends on both the shock variance and transmission. On the other 
hand, the trade model suggests that both increases in the relative variance of the global shocks 
and the transmission account for the reduction in the variance share of idiosyncratic shocks. 
Interestingly, the increased importance of the transmission of shocks in explaining output 
                                                 
20For example, the conditional distribution for the first country in the vector yi was calculated as: 
11
1
12 22 21  
      where the matrices  12  ,  22  , and  21  are the relevant partitions of the matrix  ˆ
  . - 21 - 
synchronization that the trade model indicates stems primarily from the increased transmission of 
idiosyncratic shocks. This suggests that it is not transmission from the center country, a channel 
that operates in both models, that accounts for the increased variance share of transmission. It is 
rather the intra-European or the intra-Anglo-Saxon country transmission that matters with regard 
to transmission, a fact that seems consistent with the above average output synchronization 
among European countries reported in Table 1. At the global level, on the other hand, it is 
primarily the global shocks that matter. 
 
Next, we computed the full variance-covariance matrix of the 4-year ahead forecast errors and 
analyzed the changes in the average correlation among the errors. Table 5 shows the changes in 
average forecast error correlations over time implied by our two estimated models. It shows both 
the overall change and the change implied by the change in one group of parameters only (with 
the sum across all parameter groups being equal to a first-order approximation of the change). 
Regarding the latter, we distinguish between global shocks and loadings, idiosyncratic shocks 
and their correlation, and the VAR coefficients.
21 Overall, the implied changes in forecast error 
correlations are remarkably close to the actual changes in average output correlations, 
particularly for the center model. The implications differ between models. The calculations for 
                                                 
21Specifically, the first-order contribution of the changes in the global shock variance and the factor loading between 
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the center model suggest that, on average, the increased business cycle synchronization over the 
four eras primarily reflects the increased importance of global shocks. On the other hand, the 
trade model suggests that while global shocks have become more important, the increased 
transmission accounts for a larger share of changes attributable to one parameter group. Between 
the Bretton Woods era and the modern floating era, both models indicate that increases in 
transmission have been relatively more important than they were between previous eras.  
 
C.   Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Our results imply that the answer to the question about whether the observed changes in business 
cycle synchronization can be explained mostly with changes in impulses or transmission depends 
on the model. Given obvious limitations to the power of any test with our dataset, we now turn to 
sensitivity analysis to examine the robustness of our findings. Given the problems with short data 
samples, there is no scope for sensitivity analysis for the VAR parts of the models and we will 
focus entirely on the factor structure of the VAR residuals.  
 
A first issue concerns the number of common factors. In line with standards in the literature, we 
only used the first common factor as a measure for the common shocks. As shown in Table 6, 
this factor always explains more than 20 percent of the residual variation. Nevertheless, the next 
two to three common factors also explain more than 10 percent of the residual variation. In the 
absence of clear benchmarks and tests, it is not clear what cut-off points should be chosen for the 
share of the residual variation explained by important common factors. It has been suggested in 
the literature to use common significance levels (Forni and others, 2000) even though we think - 23 - 
that in a sample like ours, a 20 percent cut-off is a more reasonable minimum for a common 
factor. However, as the results in Table 6 show, selecting a 10 percent rather than a 20 percent 
cut-off criterion would primarily change the relative shares of global and idiosyncratic shocks in 
explaining the residual variance but not the changes over time. Moreover, what has increased 
over time is primarily the share of the residual variation explained by the first common factor. 
The changes in the share of the variation explained by the second to fourth common factors are 
minor. This suggests that our results are quite robust with regard to the changes in business cycle 
synchronization on account of changes in the properties of shocks.  
 
A second issue concerns the specification and estimation of the factor model. We used the 
nonparametric estimator proposed by Stock and Watson (2002), which is an asymptotic 
estimator insofar as it relies on a large cross-sectional dimension for the identification of the 
factors. Our cross-country dimension is clearly small, and the estimated common shocks may 
include noise from idiosyncratic shocks. We therefore also estimated a parametric version of the 
factor model (3.4) using a maximum likelihood procedure. For the identification of the shocks, 
we impose the standard restrictions in static parametric factor models. In particular, we assumed 
that there is one global shock with variance 1 and that the variance-covariance matrix of the 
idiosyncratic shocks, Ση, is a diagonal matrix. Table 7 shows the implications for the shock 
variances.
22 In general, the estimated variances are very similar to those obtained with the 
nonparametric estimator for the interwar and postwar periods. They are quite different for the 
gold standard era for the trade model (but not the center model). The variance of global shocks 
                                                 
22The average global shock variance is computed as (1/16)G’G, which is equivalent to the computations underlying 
the results shown in Table 4.   - 24 - 
now exceeds the average of idiosyncratic shocks. Table 8 shows the implications for the implied 
correlations among the 4-step ahead forecast errors.    
 
IV.   BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONIZATION, GLOBAL SHOCKS, AND FINANCIAL FACTORS 
 
 
For a better understanding of the role of global shocks in international business cycle 
synchronization, Figure 3 is instructive. Each panel shows the global shocks from the trade 
model (solid lines) for an era, supplemented by dotted lines depicting the global shocks from a 
simple static approximate factor model for output growth rates (taken from Bordo and Helbling, 
2004) and bars showing time dummies—the equivalent of global shocks—from an error 
components model that are significant at the 5 percent level.
23 We estimated the latter to obtain 
another measure for large and important shocks. The global shocks implied by the two factor-
based approaches—the trade model and the simple factor model—are surprisingly similar except 
for the interwar period, although the shocks from the trade model are generally smaller in 
magnitude. The latter finding is not that surprising since the possibility of transmission implies 
lower shock variances with equal output variances. The general picture emerging from Figure 3 
is that global shocks appear noticeably important at times of world-wide downturns, suggesting 
an asymmetry between downturns and upturns.
24  
                                                 
23We estimated the following traditional error component model with our panel dataset: 
  ,, it t it y   where λt denotes a time dummy taking on the value 1 in time t and ηi,t a shock 
specific to country i.   
24This corroborates Helbling and Bayoumi (2003), who found a similar result for the G-7 countries during 1973-
2001 using quarterly data and a dynamic factor model to isolate common cycles.  - 25 - 
The current global slump has once again illustrated the pivotal role of financial factors in 
international business cycle synchronization. To analyze the role of financial factors in global 
shocks to output growth, we have sought to relate the global shocks ζt to measures of global 
financial conditions. Following English et al. (2005), we constructed a global financial 
conditions index based on the first principal component of a cross-section of financial 
indicators.
25 However, unlike English et al. (op. cit.), the cross-section is not a set of indicators 
within a country, but across the countries in our data set. Hence, our index captures common 
factors in national financial conditions.
26  
 
Unfortunately, the lack of a large cross-section of relevant and comparable financial variables 
across countries and time has forced us to consider a relatively limited set of variables only. 
Specifically, we constructed two such global financial conditions indices. The first one is based 
on real money growth in 11 countries.
27 The underlying approach is not one of “global 
monetarism.” Instead, real money growth is considered to be a proxy variable for general credit 
conditions.  The second index is also based on the real money growth rates for the 11 countries, 
but it also includes measures of real stock return for 5 countries
28, real ex post short-term interest 
rates in 4 countries,
29 and yield spreads in 4 countries.
30   
                                                 
25See also Swiston (2008). 
26The first principal component was derived from the residuals of AR(1) regressions of the underlying financial 
variables.  
27The countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.  
28France, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
29France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. - 26 - 
As shown in Table 9, correlations between the global output shocks ζt and the two global 
financial condition indices generally are not significant.
31 However, the charts in Figures 4 and 5 
suggest that financial conditions have been important in some business cycle downturns. Time 
effects in our cross-section of financial variables were typically significant at times when time 
effects in our cross-section of GDP data were also significant. As noted earlier, “global” output 
shocks seem more prevalent during downturns than during upswings.  
 
The phenomenon that there appears to be no noticeable correlation between financial 
disturbances and reference cycles except occasionally during broader international downturns 
has been noted, among others, by Morgenstern (1959, p. 64). Nevertheless, in view of the limited 
set of financial variables used to derive common financial disturbances, our results are 
preliminary at this point. Further research is needed to establish their robustness.  
 
V.   BUSINESS CYCLE SYNCHRONIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION 
 
Overall, our results are broadly consistent with globalization. With increased economic and 
financial interdependence through trade and financial linkages, the scope for global shocks or the 
rapid transmission of shocks in the center countries has clearly increased. In addition, with global 
shocks, floating exchange rates do not provide much scope for insulation, since shocks affect all 
countries in similar ways. At the same time, business cycle amplitudes have clearly moderated 
                                                                                                                                                             
30France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
31This conclusion is robust to various small modifications of the modeling assumptions. In particular, if the global 
financial conditions indices are based on residuals from AR(1) regressions that also include lagged GDP growth 
rates as regressors, the results are virtually the same.  - 27 - 
during the post-World War II period, reflecting, among other factors, changes in sectoral 
structure, automatic stabilizers, the use of lender of last resort operations, and the use of 
discretionary counter-cyclical policies.
32 In this context, it is interesting to note that the volatility 
of idiosyncratic shocks has decreased more than that of global shocks. Among other factors, this 
finding is consistent with the notion that the changes in the sectoral structure and the use of 
automatic stabilizers as well as other counter-cyclical policies have been fairly similar across the 
industrial countries.  
 
Nevertheless, some aspects of our results remain puzzling. The much larger standard deviations 
of idiosyncratic shocks during the gold standard may be explained by structural factors, the 
conduct of macroeconomic policies, and measurement errors. Clearly, agriculture was much 
more important, rendering economies more susceptible to idiosyncratic shocks as weather 
conditions. Similarly, the general absence of lender of last resort policies (except mainly in the 
core countries) and macroeconomic stabilization policies could also have contributed to 
relatively larger idiosyncratic shocks. However, the fact that the transmission of idiosyncratic 
shocks played such little role during the classical gold standard remains puzzling for 
explanations that rely on globalization as the key driving force behind changes in the factors 
driving business synchronization.  
 
In particular, the level of globalization, that is, the degree of cross-border integration in markets 
for goods, capital, and labor, has followed a U-shaped pattern during the same period (see Bordo, 
                                                 
32See McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), IMF (2002), and Stock and Watson (2005) 
for recent studies examining the volatility of output fluctuations in industrial countries, especially the United States.   - 28 - 
Eichengreen, and Irwin, 1999, and Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004). . In contrast, the time path of 
business cycle synchronization has followed a secular increase over time, almost linear if there 
were not the interwar period hump. How can we explain this disconnect? Specifically, we will 
use the results to explore three hypotheses explaining aspects of the disconnect. 
 
First, we explore what we call the global shock hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, the 
above-trend degree of business cycle synchronization during the interwar period—when 
integration was lower than during the classical gold standard— is the result of an exceptionally 
large adverse global shock. Given that the interwar period was short, with the data only covering 
the period 1925-38, this outlier colors the sample statistics of what was really a transitional 
period. We found some evidence in favor of this hypothesis. According to both the center 
country and the trade linkages models of international business cycle dynamics, the variance of 
the global shock increased relative to the idiosyncratic shocks during the interwar period. 
Everything else being equal, this explains increased cross-border output comovements. However, 
the variance decomposition of the same models suggests that increased transmission accounted 
for most of the increased role of external factors in the determination of output variances. This 
suggests that despite the on-going disintegration during the interwar period, the forces of 
transmission can still be large. Clearly, the transmission of large shocks in the largest country, 
the U.S., was, unsurprisingly, a key factor in the worldwide Great Depression.  
 
A second hypothesis is what we call the idiosyncratic shock hypothesis. This hypothesis 
postulates that changes in economic structure—especially the declining share of the agricultural 
sector in total output and the systematic use of stabilization policies—resulted in a decline in the - 29 - 
size of idiosyncratic shocks relative to global shocks. Everything else being equal, this can 
contribute to explaining increased cross-border output comovements. We found evidence in 
favor of this hypothesis for the transition from the classical gold standard to the other eras during 
which relative shock variances decreased. For other transitions, the changes in relative variances 
were, on average, very minor. 
 
A third hypothesis postulates that while seemingly similar, the depth and breadth of cross-border 
integration before World War I was different from that in the current era. The two eras of 
globalization may thus have been more different than it is sometimes assumed. Bordo, 
Eichengreen, and Irwin (1999), for example, argued that global capital market integration today 
is broader and deeper, including a larger set of financial instruments, a larger number of more 
diverse financial intermediaries operating on a global scale, and a wider range of sectors using 
international markets for financial purposes. In addition, there has been a shift from debt to 
equity finance at the global level. Similarly, in international trade, the depth or cross-border 
integration has increased (e.g., Krugman, 1995). The share of trade in tradables production has 
increased with intra-industry trade and the shift toward trade in manufacturing products, and 
producers have been able to break production geographically at a much larger scale (“vertical 
production linkages”). While we intend to investigate this hypothesis more systematically, we 
have been constrained by a lack of data. In particular, we believe that with deeper and broader 
increased economic and financial interdependence through trade and financial linkages, the 
scope for global shocks has clearly increased and even industry-specific shocks can have global 
repercussions with production linkages. In addition, with highly integrated capital markets, it - 30 - 
may be in practice quite difficult to distinguish between true global shocks and what appear to be 
global shocks but are really rapidly transmitted shocks in the center countries. 
 
 
VI.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we have documented that there is a secular trend towards increased 
synchronization for much of the twentieth century and that it occurs across diverse exchange rate 
regimes. This finding is of interest because it is in marked contrast to much of the recent 
literature, which has focused primarily on the evidence for the past 20 or 30 years and which has 
produced mixed results. 
 
We then considered a number of possible explanations for the observed pattern of increased 
synchronization. We first ascertained the role of shocks demarcated into country-specific 
(idiosyncratic) and global (common). Our key finding here is that global (common) shocks 
generally are the main influence across all regimes and models. We note, however, that with 
reduced form models of the kind used in this paper, it remains difficult to distinguish between 
“true” global shocks and major shocks in the center country(ies). Nevertheless, financial factors 
often seem to be present at times when large global output shocks can be identified.  
 
 This finding coupled with earlier evidence produced by ourselves and others that business cycles 
since World War II have become less volatile, less frequent and asymmetric with a tendency 
towards recoveries exceeding downturns in duration, has some interesting implications. We 
suggest that what may be occurring is that the weakening in national  business cycles since - 31 - 
World War II coupled with the diminution of idiosyncratic shocks reflect the forces discussed by 
Zarnowitz (1992) and others, such as changes in the composition of output, the advent of 
automatic stabilizers, improvements in discretionary monetary and fiscal policy, the 
implementation of effective lenders of last resort and a financial safety net, and the proliferation 
of private risk sharing instruments.
33  
 
At the same time, the increasing importance of global shocks and, to some extent, transmission, 
we posit reflects the forces of globalization, especially the integration of goods and services 
through international trade (Findlay and O’Rourke 2003) and the integration of financial markets 
(Obstfeld and Taylor 2003). Elsewhere, we have presented evidence showing a modest role for 
increasing bilateral trade in explaining synchronization, with stronger evidence for regional 
integration in Europe and North America (Bordo and Helbling, 2004). Evidence for the role of 
financial integration proxied by the removal of capital controls is inconclusive.  
 
We also did some exploratory work on the role of the policy regime in explaining the pattern of 
synchronization. We found little evidence for the prediction that adhering to fixed exchange rates 
fosters synchronization except in the period since 1973, and these results appear driven largely 
by the process of European Monetary Union. Clearly, further research is needed.   
                                                 
33We would like to emphasize that the decrease in idiosyncratic shock volatility does not necessarily imply that it is 
the volatility of the underlying “deep structural” shocks (e.g., a widespread drought) that we are measuring. Given 
that we derive the shocks on the basis of GDP series alone, it means that the effects of these deep shocks on output 
have diminished. There is, however, some evidence that shocks that are widely perceived as being exogenous may 
have an endogenous component. Barsky and Kilian (2001), for example, argue that the sharp increase in real oil 
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Table 1. Average Bilateral Output Correlations By Region and Era 
(Based on first differences of log output) 
                 
          
 Eras 






Modern Floating Era 
    
Region (Number of bilateral correlations)  1880-1913  1926-38  1950-72  1973-2008  1986-2008 
                 
          
 All  observations 
All countries (120)  0.03  0.17  0.16  0.16  0.35 
Core countries (15)
a 0.04  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.38 
Peripheral countries (45)
a 0.04  0.16  0.17  0.17  0.32 
One country core, one periphery (60)  0.01  0.19  0.14  0.14  0.36 
Continental European countries only (55)  0.01  0.08  0.18  0.18  0.53 
One country Continental European (55)  0.03  0.15  0.16  0.16  0.26 
Core European countries only (6)
b 0.09  0.11  0.19  0.19  0.62 
One country Core European (48)
b -0.01  0.16  0.19  0.19  0.35 
One Country North America 28)  0.03  0.32  0.02  0.02  0.40 
One country Japan (15)  -0.09  0.17  0.23  0.23  0.10 
Anglo-Saxon Countries (6)
c 0.15  0.27  0.21  0.21  0.74 
Memorandum items:           
USA-Canada 0.53  0.82  0.71  0.71  0.78 
Scandinavian countries only (6)  0.14  0.44  0.22  0.22  0.42 
One country Scandinavian (48)  0.03  0.22  0.15  0.15  0.29 
  Recession years only
d 
All countries (120)  0.05  0.23  0.20  0.49  ... 
Core countries (15)
a 0.06  0.21  0.43  0.52  ... 
Peripheral countries (45)
a 0.09  0.21  0.16  0.50  ... 
One country core, one periphery (60)  0.01  0.25  0.20  0.48  ... 
Continental European countries only (55)  0.04  0.10  0.19  0.78  ... 
          
Memorandum items:           
USA-Canada 0.81  0.92      0.94  ... 
One country Scandinavian (48)  0.03  0.33  0.22  0.49  ... 
a Core countries comprise France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland during 1880-1913 and 1920-39 ("Old Core" in subsequent tables)  
and the G-7 countries afterwards ("New Core").         
b Core European countries comprise France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland  
during 1880-1913 and 1920-39 and the EEC countries in the panel  
(France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands) afterwards. 
c Comprises Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
d Correlation coefficients during years in which at least one country experienced a recession.
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Table 2. Tests for Equality of Correlations Across Eras 
(Marginal significance levels) 
                    
            
Region (Number of bilateral correlations)  1880-1913  1926-38  1952-72  1880-1913  1880-1913  1926-38 
 versus           
 1926-38  1952-72  1973-2008  1952-72  1973-2008  1973-2008 
                    
            
  Wilcoxon Rank Sum Tests 
            
All countries (120)  0.000  0.801  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
            
  Jennrich Tests for Equality of Correlation Matrices 
            
All countries (120)  0.888  0.855  0.001  0.723  0.002  0.000 
            
Core countries (15)             
old 0.219  0.021  0.001  0.075  0.002  0.005 
new 0.204  0.237  0.004  0.258  0.002  0.000 
            
Continental European countries  (28)  0.546  0.908  0.007  0.519  0.000  0.000 
            
Anglo-Saxon Countries (6)  0.545  0.063  0.010  0.349  0.011  0.011 
            
Memorandum item:             
USA-Canada 0.179  0.477  0.677  0.340  0.108  0.663 
                    
            
Note: See Table 1 for definition of regions and country groups, and Jennrich (1970) on details of the tests. 
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Table 3. Output and Shock Standard Deviations By Era 
(Based on first differences of log output; 
principal component-based estimates of factors) 
Aggregates
a  1880-1913 1920-38  1948-72  1973-2008 
Average output growth  0.047  0.057  0.027  0.021 
Center Model        
   Global factor  0.023  0.028  0.014  0.012 
   Idiosyncratic shocks  0.037  0.040  0.020  0.015 
        
Trade Model        
   Global factor  0.022  0.017  0.013  0.010 
   Idiosyncratic shocks  0.034  0.024  0.018  0.013 











Table 4. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Output Growth  
(Fractions of forecast error variance; based on first differences of log output; simple averages over countries) 
                                         
                       
 1887-1913    1926-38 
  Global factor  Idiosyncratic factors    Global factor  Idiosyncratic factors 
 Total  Own  Transmission  Total  Own  Transmission   Total  Own  Transmission  Total  Own Transmission 
         and  covariance             and  covariance 
                                         
                      
Center  model                      
All  countries                      
1-year  ahead  0.219 0.219  0.000 0.781 0.349  0.431    0.236 0.236  0.000  0.764     
2-year  ahead  0.218 0.215  0.003 0.782 0.334  0.449    0.246 0.212  0.034  0.754     
3-year  ahead  0.217 0.214  0.003 0.783 0.330  0.453    0.249 0.209  0.041  0.751     
4-year  ahead  0.216 0.214  0.003 0.784 0.330  0.454    0.250 0.207  0.043  0.750     
                      
New  core                     
1-year  ahead  0.190 0.190  0.000 0.811 0.287  0.524    0.311 0.311  0.000  0.689     
2-year  ahead  0.188 0.188  0.000 0.812 0.282  0.530    0.315 0.291  0.024  0.685     
3-year  ahead  0.188 0.188  0.000 0.812 0.280  0.532    0.317 0.285  0.032  0.683     
4-year  ahead  0.188 0.188  0.000 0.812 0.280  0.532    0.318 0.283  0.035  0.682     
                      
O l d   c o r e                       
1-year  ahead  0.179 0.179  0.000 0.821 0.396  0.425    0.266 0.266  0.000  0.734     
2-year  ahead  0.179 0.177  0.002 0.821 0.380  0.441    0.285 0.258  0.028  0.715     
3-year  ahead  0.179 0.177  0.002 0.821 0.375  0.446    0.293 0.257  0.036  0.707     
4-year  ahead  0.179 0.177  0.002 0.821 0.374  0.447    0.296 0.256  0.039  0.704     
                      
                      
Trade  model                      
All  countries                      
1-year  ahead  0.226 0.226  0.000 0.774 0.338  0.436              
2-year  ahead  0.239 0.199  0.040 0.761 0.293  0.468              
3-year  ahead  0.240 0.192  0.048 0.760 0.281  0.479              
4-year  ahead  0.241 0.190  0.051 0.759 0.277  0.482              
                      
New  core                     
1-year  ahead  0.270 0.270  0.000 0.730 0.255  0.476              
2-year  ahead  0.278 0.249  0.029 0.722 0.225  0.497              
3-year  ahead  0.283 0.241  0.042 0.717 0.218  0.499              
4-year  ahead  0.283 0.240  0.042 0.717 0.216  0.501              
                      
O l d   c o r e                       
1-year  ahead  0.249 0.249  0.000 0.751 0.322  0.429              
2-year  ahead  0.259 0.229  0.030 0.741 0.290  0.451              
3-year  ahead  0.265 0.225  0.040 0.735 0.282  0.453              
4-year  ahead  0.264 0.224  0.040 0.736 0.281  0.455              
                                         












Table 4 (continued). Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Output Growth 
                                         
                          
 1952-72    1973-2008 
  Global factor  Idiosyncratic factors    Global factor  Idiosyncratic factors 
 Total  Own  Transmission  Total  Own  Transmission   Total Own  Transmission  Total  Own Transmission 
           and  covariance             and  covariance 
                                         
                        
Center  model                        
All  countries                        
1-year  ahead  0.279  0.279  0.000 0.721  0.217  0.504    0.385 0.385  0.000  0.615  0.359  0.256 
2-year  ahead  0.274  0.273  0.001 0.726  0.210  0.516    0.422 0.344  0.078  0.578  0.323  0.255 
3-year  ahead  0.274  0.273  0.001 0.726  0.209  0.517    0.428 0.340  0.088  0.572  0.318  0.255 
4-year  ahead  0.274  0.273  0.001 0.726  0.209  0.517    0.429 0.339  0.089  0.571  0.317  0.255 
                        
New  core                        
1-year  ahead  0.236  0.236  0.000 0.764  0.225  0.538    0.457 0.457  0.000  0.543  0.274  0.269 
2-year  ahead  0.228  0.228  0.001 0.772  0.223  0.548    0.462 0.415  0.047  0.538  0.255  0.283 
3-year  ahead  0.228  0.228  0.000 0.772  0.223  0.549    0.463 0.413  0.050  0.537  0.254  0.283 
4-year  ahead  0.228  0.228  0.000 0.772  0.223  0.549    0.463 0.413  0.050  0.537  0.254  0.283 
                        
O l d   c o r e                         
1-year  ahead  0.424  0.424  0.000 0.576  0.187  0.389    0.502 0.502  0.000  0.498  0.312  0.185 
2-year  ahead  0.413  0.414  0.000 0.587  0.185  0.402    0.536 0.444  0.091  0.464  0.265  0.199 
3-year  ahead  0.413  0.413  0.000 0.587  0.185  0.402    0.539 0.439  0.100  0.461  0.261  0.200 
4-year  ahead  0.413  0.413  0.000 0.587  0.185  0.402    0.540 0.439  0.101  0.460  0.260  0.200 
                        
                        
Trade  model                       
All  countries                      
1-year  ahead  0.319  0.319  0.000 0.681  0.215  0.466    0.315 0.315  0.000  0.685  0.364  0.321 
2-year  ahead  0.325  0.278  0.047 0.675  0.172  0.503    0.276 0.250  0.026  0.724  0.268  0.456 
3-year  ahead  0.319  0.270  0.049 0.681  0.166  0.516    0.263 0.236  0.027  0.737  0.242  0.495 
4-year  ahead  0.318  0.268  0.050 0.682  0.165  0.517    0.257 0.232  0.025  0.743  0.235  0.508 
                        
New  core                        
1-year  ahead  0.268  0.268  0.000 0.732  0.195  0.537    0.465 0.465  0.000  0.535  0.282  0.254 
2-year  ahead  0.264  0.245  0.020 0.736  0.176  0.560    0.379 0.379  -0.001  0.621  0.237  0.384 
3-year  ahead  0.262  0.238  0.024 0.738  0.172  0.566    0.362 0.368  -0.006  0.638  0.229  0.409 
4-year  ahead  0.263  0.237  0.026 0.737  0.172  0.566    0.356 0.366  -0.010  0.644  0.228  0.416 
                        
O l d   c o r e                         
1-year  ahead  0.485  0.485  0.000 0.515  0.167  0.348    0.424 0.424  0.000  0.576  0.306  0.269 
2-year  ahead  0.466  0.458  0.008 0.534  0.147  0.387    0.364 0.343  0.022  0.636  0.242  0.393 
3-year  ahead  0.464  0.454  0.010 0.536  0.145  0.391    0.343 0.332  0.011  0.657  0.231  0.426 
4-year  ahead  0.464  0.452  0.012 0.536  0.145  0.391    0.338 0.330  0.007  0.662  0.229  0.434 
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Table 5. Explaining Changes in Business Cycle Synchronization 
(Changes in Average Correlation of 4-step Ahead Forecast Errors) 
           
        
  1926-38 1952-72 1973-2008  1973-2008
  versus 
  1880-1913 1926-38 1952-72  1880-1913
           
        
Center Model        
Change in correlation implied by model 
a 0.115 0.024 0.176  0.315
Owing to changes in 
b        
Global factor variance 
c  0.083 -0.037 0.049  0.095
Idiosyncratic shock variance-
covariance  -0.014 0.038 0.022  0.046
VAR coefficients  0.026 -0.029 0.045  0.042
        
        
        
Trade Model 
d        
Change in correlation implied by model 
a   0.151 0.154  0.305
Owing to changes in 
b        
Global factor variance 
c    0.083 -0.034  0.048
Idiosyncratic shock variance-
covariance    -0.052 0.048  -0.004
VAR coefficients    -0.016 0.090  0.074
        
Memorandum        
Actual change in average correlation 0.141 -0.038 0.216  0.319
           
a Bilateral correlations implied by model using parameters for each era.   
b First order approximation of changes in correlation implied by changes in a parameter group.
c Including changes in factor loadings.        
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Table 6. Factor Analysis of VAR Residual Variance-Covariance Matrix 
(Share of the residual variance-covariance matrix explained by each factor)  
                 
           
  1887-1913 1926-38 1952-72    1973-2008
            
Center model            
Factor             
1 0.219   0.236   0.279    0.385
2 0.127   0.170   0.128    0.148
3 0.112   0.194   0.105    0.088
4 0.078   0.137   0.082    0.074
5 0.099   0.069   0.081    0.077
6 0.083   0.047   0.071    0.052
7 0.058   0.059   0.058    0.047
8 0.060   0.026   0.058    0.036
9 0.040   0.032   0.044    0.024
10 0.029   0.022   0.017    0.024
            
Cumulative  share of factors             
explaining more than 10 percent  0.458   0.736   0.512    0.533
            
Trade model            
Factor            
1 0.226      0.319    0.361
2 0.148      0.128    0.140
3 0.138      0.156    0.106
4 0.084      0.068    0.086
5 0.088      0.078    0.070
6 0.083      0.057    0.065
7 0.064      0.061    0.049
8 0.039      0.054    0.034
9 0.043      0.020    0.030
            
Cumulative  share of factors             
explaining more than 10 percent  0.512      0.604    0.607
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Table 7. Output and Shock Standard Deviations By Era 
(Based on first differences of log output; 
maximum likelihood-based estimates of factors) 
Aggregates
a  1880-1913 1920-38  1948-72  1973-2001 
Average output growth  0.047  0.057  0.027  0.021 
Center Model        
   Global factor  0.020  0.025  0.013  0.011 
   Idiosyncratic shocks  0.040  0.048  0.023  0.016 
        
Trade Model        
   Global factor  0.040    0.013  0.010 
   Idiosyncratic shocks  0.023    0.020  0.015 
a Unweighted averages across countries.   - 44 - 
Table 8. Explaining Changes in Business Cycle Synchronization 
(Changes in Average Correlation of 4-step Ahead Forecast Errors) 
           
        
  1926-38 1952-72 1973-2008  1973-2008
  versus
  1880-1913 1926-38 1952-72  1880-1913
           
        
Center Model (ML estimation of factors)      
Change in correlation implied by model 
a 0.097 0.064 0.174  0.334
Owing to changes in 
b       
Global factor variance 
c  0.078 0.004 0.047  0.130
Idiosyncratic shock variance-
covariance  -0.007 0.040 0.041  0.073
VAR coefficients  0.025 -0.030 0.038  0.032
        
        
Trade Model (ML estimation of factors)
d      
Change in correlation implied by model 
a   0.163 0.164  0.327
Owing to changes in 
b       
Global factor variance 
c    0.0489 -0.0197  0.0292
Idiosyncratic shock variance-
covariance    0.003 0.0364  0.0394
VAR coefficients    0.012 0.115  0.127
        
Memorandum       
Actual change in average correlation 0.141 -0.038 0.216  0.319
           
a Bilateral correlations implied by model using parameters for each era.
b First order approximation of changes in correlation implied by changes in a parameter group.
c Including changes in factor loadings.       
d Changes for 1952-72 are against 1880-1913 (see text for details).   
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Table 9. Common Shock Correlations
a
(Standard errors in parenthesis)
                 
           
  1887-1913   1926-38   1952-72   1973-2008
                  
  Correlation with common real money shocks (mt) 
Common GDP shocks            
yt+1  0.004   0.018   0.001   -0.002
  (0.005) (0.01) (0.001) (0.002)
yt  -0.013   0.025   0.007   -0.003
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.002)
yt-1  0.003   -0.001   -0.003   -0.001
  (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002)
            
  Correlation with common real money shocks (ft) 
Common GDP shocks            
yt+1  -0.002   0.026   0.001   0.001
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.003)
yt  -0.004   0.015   0.006   0.004
  (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003)
yt-1  0.001   0.022   -0.005   -0.002
  (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.003)
                  
            
aStandard errors of correlation coefficients were derived with a generalized method of  
moment estimator. 
    
 
 













































Figure 2. Distribution of VAR Coefficients By Eras
(Averages across countries and 5 and 95-percent percentiles)
Note: The charts show the location of the average of the coefficients across countries for each era (depicted with square 
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  Figure 3. Global Shocks, 1887-2008
(Solid Lines: center model; dotted lines: trade model; bars: significant time effects)

























































































  Figure 4. Global Money and GDP Shocks, 1887-2001
(Blue bars: significant time effects GDP; red bars: significant time effects real money)




















































































  Figure 5. Global Financial and GDP Shocks, 1887-2001
(Blue bars: significnat time effects GDP (rhs); red bars/lines: significant time effects financial conditions)
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